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On 27 November 2019, Turkey and the Libyan internationally recognized
Government of National Accord (GNA) agreed on a median line delimiting
their respective continental shelf and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in a
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) which constitutes an international
agreement (Art. 2 (1)(a) VCLT) despite its unusual title. By its virtue the States
claimed extensive sovereign rights regarding the resource-rich Mediterranean
Sea which is once more causing tensions in the region – in particular between
Turkey and Greece.
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(posted
on Twitter by Ça#atay Erciyes, Director General for Bilateral Political &
Maritime-Aviation-Border Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Content of the MoU
For the purpose of delimiting their continental shelf and EEZ the parties agreed on
an 18.6 nm median line (points E-F) resulting in a Turkish-claimed maritime zone
conspicuously close to the Greek islands of Crete, Rhodos, Kasos and Karpathos
and enclosing the island of Kastellorizo. The resulting sovereign rights that the
coastal State exercises over the continental shelf are extensive: They include
the exploration and exploitation of its natural resources (Art. 77 (1) UNCLOS)
encompassing the oil and gas exploitation which is a significant economic interest for
the Eastern Mediterranean States. The coastal State additionally has the exclusive
- 2 -
right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf (Art. 81 UNCLOS).
And even more: In the EEZ the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights relating to the
waters superjacent to and of the seabed and its subsoil and exercises jurisdiction
inter alia with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures (Art. 56 (1) UNCLOS).
Reaction of neighboring States
The agreement and the resulting distribution of sovereign rights between Turkey
and Libya caused outrage among the neighboring States: One day after the MoU
was concluded, the Greek foreign minister called the MoU a ‘flagrant violation of
international law’. Similarly, Israel and Egypt condemned the MoU as illegal.
This instant and strong condemnation is fueled by Israel, Greece and Cyprus having
planned the construction of a gas pipeline (‘EastMed-pipeline’) whose exact course
is now by virtue of the MoU subject to Turkey’s and Libya’s consent (Art. 79 (3)
UNCLOS). At least from the perspective of Turkey’s neighboring States, the MoU is
but another Turkish attempt to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region. With
regard to maritime disputes between the Eastern Mediterranean States, history has
been quite eventful seeing the unresolved Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean
Sea continental shelf, the dispute concerning the Imia Islets (1995/1996) and most
recently the conflict concerning the Turkish drilling in territorial waters claimed by
Cyprus.
Particularly outraged: Greece
Greek officials did not stop at informal condemnation but took measures further: The
Libyan ambassador in Greece was expelled and a complaint was filed to the United
Nations. The reason for this outcry by Greece in particular can be found in the fact
that by delimiting the continental shelf and EEZ in the agreement with the Libyan
GNA, Turkey now claims territorial rights over the same area in the Mediterranean as
Greece.
Turkey’s Ministry of Justice substantiated its endeavor (in a statement deleted
on their website, but available here) with the contention that the Greek islands in
question do not create their own continental shelf and may not be the basis for
establishing an EEZ. Consequently, no conflicting claims exist in the region affected
by the MoU. From a legal perspective this is questionable since it runs contrary
to the rule enshrined in Art. 121 (2) UNCLOS, incorporating customary law (Qatar
v Bahrain, para. 185). It is additionally not in line with international jurisprudence,
usually attributing islands at least some effect on the creation of maritime zones
depending on the individual circumstances such as size, population and location
of the islands in question (see Guinea v Guinea-Bissau Arbitral Award, para. 95;
1977 Award concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Great
Britain and France, para. 251; Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia/Libya), para. 129).
As an alternative argument Turkey claims to be a ‘persistent objector’ to Art. 121 (2)
UNCLOS (which is however contested according to Maria Lobo and Stefan Talmon).
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The status as persistent objector would result in the rule’s non-binding nature for
Turkey.
Greece however seems to dismiss this status by stating that the MoU infringes upon
sovereign rights, in particular ipso jure existent claims over the continental shelf (Art.
77 (3) UNCLOS) surrounding the aforementioned islands.
The situation regarding the EEZ however must be assessed differently: A coastal
State’s EEZ does not exist ipso jure but its existence is subject to a constitutive
declaration. While Greece reserves its right to declare an EEZ in the region affected
by the MoU, it is important to note that it has not officially done so – making it legally
non-existent. The delimitation of a potential Greek EEZ in the affected region would
now depend on an agreement with Turkey and possibly Libya pursuant to Art. 74 (1)
UNCLOS. Since Turkey and Libya have obviously not reserved a seat for Greece at
the negotiating table in the past and Turkey is starting to create facts by announcing
its plans to start oil exploitation in the region, Greece may see its position in that
regard as considerably weakened. Since neither Turkey nor Libya are parties to
UNCLOS, its dispute settlement mechanisms for disputes concerning the application
of the dispute are not helpful to resolve this conflict. Turkey has moreover not
recognized the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory which
makes a peaceful settlement of the dispute using these institutional mechanisms
difficult to imagine.
Final remarks
The rights provided by the law of the sea for the continental shelf and EEZ regarding
oil and gas exploitation and the laying of pipelines in those maritime zones affect
economic interests of potentially all Eastern Mediterranean States. It is also in line
with the long history of maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece which have
even caused the States to be at the verge of an armed conflict in the course of the
disagreements concerning the Aegean Sea and the Imia isles. While an armed
conflict is not in sight at this point, the maritime claims made in the agreement have
already raised tensions in the region.
Even in light of these tensions, Greece, Cyprus and Israel have now signed an
agreement paving the way for the construction of the EastMed-pipeline, seemingly
ignoring the Turkish and Libyan claims in the region. Turkey promptly condemned
this step, calling the signature ‘the latest instance of futile steps’ to exclude Turkey’s
interests in the region. It then announced its plans to begin drilling in the area
affected by the Turkish-Libyan MoU.
Considering the long-standing tradition of maritime conflict in the region and
the resulting potential for escalation, the current developments are not to be
underestimated. In any case, the MoU has already proven its negative effect on
the stability in the region. Consequently, it is already failing the original purpose of
delimitation agreements: Achieving legal certainty regarding the maritime zones in
question and thus providing political stability.
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